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NEW TRENDS
Globalization, Translation, and the Limits of Area Studies
Lead Us Not into Translation
Notes toward a Theoretical Foundation for Asian Studies
Michael Dutton
I begin this work with a simple ques-
tion. Why is it impossible to imagine, much less write, a work like Michel
Foucault’sDiscipline and Punishwithin Asian area studies? The impossibil-
ity I am referring to is not of content but of form. It is not just about writing
such a text but about having it read as something more than a description;
having it read for its theoretical signiﬁcance more generally. That is to say,
it is about the impossibility of writing a work that is principally of a theo-
retical nature but that is empirically and geographically grounded in Asia
rather than in Europe or America. Why is it that, when it comes to Asian
area studies, whenever “theory” is invoked, it is invariably understood to
mean “applied theory” and assumed to be of value only insofar as it helps
tell the story of the “real” in a more compelling way?
To some extent, what follows is an attempt to explain historically
howWestern area studies on Asia came to appreciate theory in this limited
and limiting way. At the same time, as I began to investigate the history and
prehistory of this diaphanous ﬁeld, I began to recognize the possibilities of
a very different form of area studies that could have emerged had different
sets of pressures pushed it in a slightly different direction. This essay is
therefore an attempt to recuperate these now forgotten possibilities and to
build on them in order to produce a different way of seeing, writing, and
theorizing Asian area studies.
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Tales of Translation
Story One
There is a story told today about an event in ancient China wherein ﬁve
hundred archers were said to have been dispatched, on the emperor’s ex-
press orders, to a coastal location near Hangzhou that was about to be
reclaimed by imperial engineers. There, in an event that enabled the com-
mencement of this major project, arrows were ﬁred into the sea to ward off
the dragon god. These “opening shots” are, in a contemporaryWestern rec-
ollection of the event, said to be “ceremonial,” warning the dragon god not
to make (violent) waves. Yet the object of this form of “ceremony” and the
“engineering” project that it “celebrated” were, in fact, of equal weight, for
both were designed to outwit the dragon god and fend off the tempestuous
sea so that the land could be reclaimed for the emperor. The techniques
differed—the archer used the bow, the engineer, science and technic (in
Georges Bataille’s [1979] sense)—but their objects were identical. Yet when
this account is retold in our time and in our functionalist logic, it becomes
a story of scientiﬁc discovery, and the archers’ tale is relegated to a “cere-
monial space” somewhere on the margins of this main scientiﬁc account.
For me, while the functionalist analysis is a useful corrective to idealism,
there is much more to tell, both in the archer’s tale and in its retelling as
“ceremonial.”1
Howmuch can we trust the unity imposed by this (positivist) nar-
rative strategy? Surely the instrumentalist (re)telling of the archer’s tale as
a “ceremonial aside” within an overarching story of a developing technical
and scientiﬁc proﬁciency should set off a ripple of doubt. After all, the story
of scientiﬁc curiosity, technical advance, and careful and exact inquiry into
currents, winds, and sea patterns, a tale familiar to any contemporaryWest-
ern reader, now appears stalked by another (more ominous) ﬁgure. The
shadow of the inexplicable “other” side and “other” logic darkens this ﬁg-
ure of ceremony,which threatens to turn the tranquil and familiarwaters of
“our” comprehensibility into something far more uncertain and incalcula-
ble. To “read” sea currents anthropomorphically, as the emperor surely did
when he dispatched a team of archers to tame the sea dragon, threatens the
exactness of calculation and the economy of science that contemporary pos-
itivist accounts of these events promote. It threatens to disrupt the unity of
what Bataille (1979, 65) once described as the “homogeneous world”—that
is, a world of production, science, technic, and rationality—with the dis-
quieting, inexplicable murmur of “unproductive” excess and transgression
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that he would come to call “heterogeneity.” It is for this reason that, in
(re)telling this tale within a story of scientiﬁc development, it proves all too
tempting to render this heterogeneous event as “nothing more” than the
popping of a champagne cork, the smashing of a bottle on the bow of a
boat, or the “ceremonial” ﬁring of arrows into the sea. It is convenient to
treat this moment as that ceremonial preface that is always already familiar
to us and, one may care to add, that thereby comes to count for very little.
The reproduction of this event as a mere “ceremonial” aside—a
somewhat comical, eccentric interlude before the “main act”—or better
still, to retell this heterogeneous tale homogeneously by describing it as
the “ideological [ceremonial] kernel” around which an otherwise healthy
scientiﬁc seed was growing, is not only designed to make us feel we have
left the troubled and threatening sea for the security of more solid ground,
but also to describe the very basis of the Western scientiﬁc method. And it
is in the work of Bruno Latour and the retelling of another seaside tale that
the most compelling evidence of this point can be found.
Story Two
In the ﬁnal part of Latour’s remarkable account of the development of
scientiﬁc method, he illustrates his argument about “science in action”
by recourse to the narrative technique of allegory. Scientiﬁc “action at a
distance,” in Latour’s exempliﬁcation, takes place on a faraway island (in
the distance), with the visit of a Western boat (action) and the recording
techniques, transmissions, and ﬁnally incorporation into aWestern canon of
the captain’s notes (science).2 This parable of science, almost in opposition
to its own emphasis on rationality, begins, like most fairy tales, with the
dawning of a new day:
Atdawn, 17 July 1787,Lapérouse, captain ofL’Astrolabe, landed
at an unknown part of the East Paciﬁc, on an area of land that
was called “Segalien” or “Sakhalin” in the older travel books he
had brought with him. Was this land a peninsula or an island?
He did not know, that is, no one in Versailles at the court of
Louis XVI, no one in London, no one in Amsterdam in the
headquarters of theWest Indies Company, could look at a map
of the Paciﬁc Ocean and decide whether the engraved shape of
what was called “Sakhalin” was tied to Asia or was separated
by a strait. (Latour 1987, 215)
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As Latour points out, it was the task of the comte de La Pérouse
to solve the riddle of these lands. With notebook in hand and “native”
before him, the captain began a process of extraction that culminated in
revelations being told about this land and the mysteries that surrounded
it. La Pérouse’s role was not to write down everything his informants
told him. His task was to extract from the otherwise “fuzzy, approximate
and sometimes ungrounded beliefs of local knowledge” what was deemed
to have value as scientiﬁc raw material (Latour 1987, 216). Having ex-
tracted, La Pérouse then compressed. Lengthy tales of gods and legends
were “translated” intomore “rational” instrumental accounts. The scientiﬁc
seed was extracted, the information translated, and the detail compressed
into a mere diary entry. The lived knowledge of the indigenous informant
that had taken years to acquire was noted down in summary form that
would require no more than a few hours to write and much less time than
that to read. La Pérouse would then move on to other islands, other ac-
counts, other extractions, other compressions, . . . other translations. The
indigenous inhabitants’ stories would be told time and time again, but in
a translated form they would neither know nor recognize as their own.
While they drew maps in the sand for La Pérouse, told him of gods and
serpents, and used their version of time—amapwas drawn to indicate how
far their canoes would take them in one day—to indicate distance, this in-
formation, when it found its way back to France and into that elaborate
dispersed knowledge machine that was the scientiﬁc community, would
end up taking on a very different form.
There, within this community of scientists, technicians, and plan-
ners, all dedicated to making the world manageable, intelligible, and port-
able, La Pérouse’s notes were translated into details that would enhance the
“bigger picture” of the world known in the language of Western cartogra-
phers as the navigational chart. The islands La Pérouse had “discovered”
and the details he had taken from the indigenous inhabitants now reap-
peared in a translated form as a mark on a map. It is this map that marks
the distances traveled not only by La Pérouse’s boat, but also by Western
scientiﬁc mapping.
From the earliest Christian T-O maps that placed the holy city of
Jerusalem at their heart3 to the later, more elaborate medieval maps that
were like logs of pilgrimages undertaken andwondrous religious sites seen,
charts of this European past were largely elaborate ideological mapping
exercises (Mignolo 1993, 221–22). These intricately coded systems, carrying
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both ideological and geographic meaning, display a European sensibility
very different from the one in which La Pérouse’s “discoveries” would
ﬁnally ﬁnd their home. Sometime between the ﬁfteenth and seventeenth
centuries the tour disappeared and the itinerary was put under erasure.
The stories of life, travels, and tours were “ﬂattened out” and vanished. No
longer a heterogeneous collection of ideologically invested signs, the map
became instead the site of a new clustering of knowledgewewould come to
call interdisciplinary. It would draw on the ﬁelds of geometry, navigation,
and observational ethnography and “speak” in the table-language of science
rather than in a dialect of the pilgrim’s tale.Maps became the “proper places
in which to exhibit the products of knowledge, [and] form tables of legible
results” (de Certeau 1984, 121). This “colonization” of space by themap and
chart was one of the effects of the birth of science (120).With science, rather
than religion, now being the guiding ethos, the map was transformed into
a very different type of instrumentalist “technology.” Ultimately, with new
additions and clariﬁcations, it would redraw the world along vectors that
would make a return journey from Europe to the islands of La Pérouse
not only possible, but far more predictable (Latour 1987, 221). Extraction,
translation, mobility, and an ability to combine with and reconﬁgure other
elements of an existing story; this was the very stuff of “science in action.”
It is also the “stuff” that ties Latour’s vignette of La Pérouse back
to the contemporary account of an ancient Chinese “engineering” work.
Like the extractive “science work” undertaken by La Pérouse, this contem-
porary account of ancient Chinese dyke making extracted the “ceremonial”
conditions and translated the valued remainder into something that could
be combined with other knowledge. It would, by exclusion, deﬁne what
was deemed the “essential component” of indigenous knowledge. Having
removed the dross, it would conﬁdently (re)classify the building of dykes
as an “engineering project.” Both this story and that of La Pérouse are
tales of extraction, translation, mobility, and an ability to combine with
and reconﬁgure other elements of an existing story. They are, methodolog-
ically, discrete domains of “science in action,” and, as one moves from the
natural sciences toward the nascent social sciences and from the end of
the eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century, one discovers that
the buried ideological effects of this “rigorous,” “objective,” and “scien-
tiﬁc” remapping of the world would take another name: imperialism. To
excavate this requires moving to my third and ﬁnal vignette.
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Story Three
At the end of the nineteenth century, in the middle of Paris, the Exposi-
tion Universelle opened its gates to the French public and its sights to the
public gaze. The world, as Timothy Mitchell (1988, 6) puts it, was thereby
enframed. It was rendered, Mussorgsky-like, as a picture at an exhibition,
but one that clearly put trade “in the frame.” The earlier Crystal Palace
exhibition in England offered a stunning example of this. Exhibiting space
was granted only on the basis of the value attributed to what one had to sell.
It was on this basis, and no other, that nations and space were reordered in a
calibrated hierarchy which led to the non-Western world occupying small,
marginal corners of the exhibition site: non-Western countries had little of
value and therefore little to say in a world ordered around the market and
the modern. Indeed, the vast majority of the non-Western exhibits were
supplied by European colonialists who treated these lands and their com-
modities as little short of a joke. Costumes, trinkets, carpets, and hookahs
appeared to be the standard array of goods, says C. R. Fay (1951, 88) in his
account of Crystal Palace, and these sat somewhat uncomfortably along-
side theWest’s latest technological inventions. Here was amapping exercise
very different from the one that occupied the mind of La Pérouse, but the
logic and method behind it were eerily familiar. Extraction, mobility, and
an ability to combine with and reconﬁgure other elements of an existing
story was not only the stuff of science in action, but clearly also a central
part of imperialism in action.
Like secularized T-O maps of old, these trade fairs reveal an ide-
ological remapping of the world with theWest in the center and its agenda
on top. In Paris this would be embodied by Gustave Eiffel’s tower, the
ultimate sign of Western artistic, engineering, and “natural” brilliance.4
Mimicking the structure of plant life in a manner that would later ﬁnd
full artistic expression in the photography of Karl Blossfeldt, Eiffel created
an engineering masterpiece using load-bearing iron girders connected in
a manner reminiscent of the common plant. Yet there was nothing “com-
mon” about Eiffel’s tower. Built for the Exposition Universelle and located
in the center of the site, it offered an overview of all below and stood as
the ultimate sign of Western (and bourgeois) dominance over nature and
the world. As if to reinforce this, on the grounds below, and in the shadow
of the tower itself, sat another sign of Western dominance, a French-built
Egyptian exhibit that reproduced perfectly awinding backstreet scene from
Cairo. Such perfect reproduction was conﬁrmation of Western brilliance,
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not simply because of the architecture of the streetscape but because of the
Western technical ability to replicate, in the heart of Paris, the soul of Cairo.
Here was a streetscape complete with traditional Egyptian house veneers
and the facade of a mosque modeled on the one in Qaitbay. Here was a
street scene populated by imported Egyptian donkeys complete with han-
dlers offering rides, Egyptian dancing girls entertaining the passersby, and
French traders dressed as Arabs selling trinkets from their bazaar stalls.
Even the dirt on the painted buildings was replicated (Mitchell 1988, 1).
Old Cairo was transported and in the process transformed. Yet this process
of transformation—from lived social form to sideshow—only conﬁrmed
the power of the West to extract, replicate, and make anything, anywhere,
portable and intelligible in its own terms.
It is with this form of mimesis, where the eye is ﬁrmly ﬁxed
on transporting things into the homogeneous world, that the logic of the
trade exhibition, the diary of La Pérouse, and the contemporary rendition
of traditional Chinese engineering meet. It is in these three stories that
one confronts the relationship between science, translation, and the epis-
temic violence of imperialism. TheWest, it seems, could translate anything.
Through the spread of scientiﬁc method, texts, buildings, and even life it-
self were opened to the West’s gaze. The tower of Gustave Eiffel became
its Babel and the new universal message was that science could conquer
all and would make the world whole and wholly intelligible. A new uni-
versal language was emerging, not out of the rubble of philology or even
out of language proper. Rather, this new universal language was “reason”
and its battering ram, capitalism.5 Capitalism dreamed of ﬂattening the
world in the way science had once ﬂattened the monastic pilgrimage maps
into navigational charts. Now the desire to trade would ﬂatten difference.
Consumption andmaterial desire would point to a new universal language.
Materialism would obliterate the dialects of dissent, be they the sacred, the
opaque, or the heterogeneous. The homogeneous world would be victori-
ous and, like the colonialists of old, would redraw the map and paint each
land in its own colors. If the nineteenth century held out this promise, it is
in the twenty-ﬁrst that we are now being told the promise is being fulﬁlled.
As globalization spreads, it cuts its way through different cultural and lived
forms and leads to claims not only about shared desires but also about a
shared universal logic of desire. It is in critiquing this logic, a logic now
transformed into a more general “style of thought” and sometimes spoken
in the “objective” language of the contemporary social sciences, that I want
to begin to speak of a dialect of potential dissent offered from within a
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new type of Asian area studies. It is my contention that, if reconﬁgured
into a domain that speaks to, and of, the occluded heterogeneous world
of otherness, Asian area studies has the potential to send ripples of doubt
through the dominant positivist social science “stories.”
Bringing the Stories up to Date
Basing themselves on a (predominantly nineteenth-century) notion of how
the “hard” sciences work (Cumings 2002) these social sciences have pro-
duced “applied” models that enlist the now familiar methodology outlined
above. Indeed, it is through this methodology that they now lay claim to
being objective, rigorous, and scientiﬁc. This, of course, involves the erad-
ication or dismissal of unwanted signs of the heterogeneous that cannot
be incorporated into the homogeneous world of “their” reason. Nowhere
was this process more in evidence than in the ongoing, troubled marriage
of comparativist social science modeling and the scholarship that supplied
these models with much of their “raw” data on other cultures. As this mar-
riage disintegrates, one begins to notice the social scientiﬁc process through
which that which cannot easily be incorporated is assimilated, then re-
pressed. Yet, as is clear from the tale of the Chinese dyke builders and their
penchant for “ceremony,” “themystery that is incorporated, then, repressed,
is never destroyed. . . . history never effaces what it buries; it always keeps
within itself the secret of whatever it encrypts, the secret of its secrets”
(Derrida 1995, 21). It is in disinterring this “secret of its secrets” that the
heterogeneous possibilities of a new area studies of the sign are revealed,
and the radical potential of the ﬁeld made real. But there is much to do
before that possibility can be realized.
As a geographically deﬁned area of study, rather than a theoreti-
cally driven discipline, area studies had long argued that it was interdisci-
plinary but, as it looked over its shoulder at the “hard” social sciences, it was
stalked by the fear that it had no discipline at all. The social sciences had for
years made this claim about area studies, and their response, in arguing for
a more “area-centric knowledge,” only reinforced the suspicion that area
studies was indeed a ﬁeld dominated by descriptive “social translators.”
Lacking the type of theoretical and “scientiﬁc” rigor the disciplines claimed
to offer, area studies deﬁned itself only in the shadows of other disciplines
and reiﬁed its unique quality, translation. But it was this “one thing” that
would damn it in the eyes of social scientists.
The most recent and formidable critiques of area studies come
from political science, and of those the most vocal is Robert H. Bates.
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In a series of articles that damned area studies for lacking the necessary
theoretical rigor to rival the social sciences intellectually, Bates called for
a new approach that would merely reinforce the already existing role of
area studies as subservient subordinate translator. Social science knowledge
would be privileged in this arrangement for, unlike the translational prac-
tices of the empirically based area study, only it was “equipped to handle
area knowledge in a rigorous fashion” (Bates 1996, 2). For Bates, at least,
the new universal “scientiﬁc” techniques deployed by the “rigorous” social
scientist were all versions of rational choice theory. With this approach,
cultural difference becomes but one variable in a “game” that is constantly
reworked to “prove” both the particular argument being proffered and,
more important, the universalism of the model being deployed.6 In fact, all
that this model building proved, if proof be needed, was the logocentric
nature of the paradigms that dominate the contemporary social science dis-
ciplines. The faith of political scientists in both the rationality of political
actors and in the objectivity of their theoretical models required only em-
pirical veriﬁcation. It was at this point that the social sciences would require
local translators fromwhom they could gain useful descriptive information
that could be reworked into empirical proof of their scientiﬁc theories. For
the social scientist, the usefulness of the local knowledge supplied by the
area studies specialist was therefore also a sign of the theoretical weakness
of the ﬁeld. In many respects, area studies had only itself to blame for this
predicament, for it has always, and quite promiscuously, offered itself in
this way.
Within the subﬁeld or area studies I know best, a line can be traced
from the very earliest Jesuit encounters with China through to our day and,
despite massive shifts in what and how objects of desire are translated, the
model of the area studies scholar as translator remained dominant. Indeed,
the onedeﬁning characteristic of the sinologistwas this ability to translate—
both linguistically and culturally. AsDavidMungello (1985, 135) points out
in his examination of some of the earliest European attempts to theorize
China and its language, theorists always seemed to have “knowledgeable
friends.” Gottfried Leibniz had Joachim Bouvet, Athanasius Kircher had
Michael Boym, and Christian Mentzal had Philippe Couplet, in much the
same way that Julia Kristeva “had” her sinologist-translator, Marcel Gar-
net. Even when theoretical opportunities did emerge as possibilities for
area studies—as happened in recent times when Edward Said rendered
the empirical relationship between “Europe and its other” theoretical by
describing it as an ontologically and epistemologically charged “style of
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thought”—they are brought down to earth and employedwithin area stud-
ies as a means to reinforce what could only be described as the “translator’s
advantage.” Paul Cohen (1984), who offered possibly the ﬁrst detailed re-
sponse from within Chinese studies to Orientalism, employed this work
to authorize his “China-centric approach,” which was little more than a
critique of theory based on an unreconstructed (and unrealizable) form of
empiricism. Why is there such truculent antitheoretical empiricism within
area studies? The reasons are manifold but one key reason that has never
fully been scrutinized relates to training.
Western area studies knowledges are language-based and learning
languages has come to operate as a “rite of passage” into Asian area studies
for any scholar. Yet it has also, unconsciously, becomemuchmore than that;
the narrowly deﬁned applied nature of area studies—which lies at the heart
of its truculent empiricism—is based on unconscious appropriations from,
and a close kinship to, the types of methods employed in language training
itself. This methodological kinship between textual and cultural transla-
tion is not fortuitous, I would argue, but emerges from a path taken out
of the philological tradition by Oriental studies, a path that would become
fully developed by the time it was named Asian area studies. What I want
to suggest is that the transition from classical philology, of which Oriental
studies was a part, into comparative philology, from whence it departed,
laid the intellectual ground on which area studies’ descriptive and applied
translational practices reiﬁed an observational method of knowledge ac-
quisition. It is this history that I want to retrace in order to bring forth
a repressed alternative of “doing” that could establish the basis for a very
different Asian area studies.
Philology, that “empirical science of the spirit” as Ernest Renan
(quoted in Olender 1992, 52) so romantically called it, was a nodal point in
a discursive ﬁeld that not only gave birth to linguistics, but also played a
key role in the formation of Oriental and later Asian area studies. While
it is certainly true that Oriental studies was irreducible to philology and
philology was much more than Oriental studies, the degree of interpene-
tration andmutual authorization forworks undertakenwithin these paired
ﬁelds was nonetheless signiﬁcant.7 Oriental studies was crucial to philol-
ogy insofar as the Oriental languages gave added impetus to the changes
within language study, which then moved philology away from its search
for a theological origin. The philological tradition was, in turn, pivotal to
Oriental studies, because it predisposed the ﬁeld to a way of seeing that
would add a social, political, economic, and cultural dimension to Roman
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Jakobson’s (1992) now famous formulation that anything is translatable. It
was this type of formulation that would solidify and stabilize around the
methodology of applied language appropriation and translation; for, as is
well known, language is the one and only unifying criteria of this ﬁeld.8
This would then be reiﬁed by the protocols of academic publishing and the
utilitarian demands of missionaries, colonialists, governments, and, more
recently, business. The “applied” nature of this ﬁeld came to set the bound-
aries for what would become an acceptable form of scholarship. In other
words, the applied methods of language acquisition shone a light on more
general forms of applied knowledge acquisition.
The repetitive, rote learning techniques employed to acquire lan-
guage inadvertently reinforced a particular understanding of the relation-
ship between “text” and “interpretation,” and this would then “solidify”
into a mimetically recoded and quite classical binary between “real” and
“thought” (Niranjana 1992). This “slippage” would then produce a set
of unconscious understandings that dialectically fed back into the general
scholarly program of area studies, producing a tautological justiﬁcation for
the “realist,” empiricist, and “applied” approach to knowledge acquisition.
The self-evident obviousness and pregiven “realness” of the text became
metonymically linked to the pregiven obviousness and realness of “nation”
or “culture”; and it was this form of “applied translational practice” that
came to constitute the very basis of area studies knowledge.9 While there
are, of course, “stakeholders” (government and business, to name but two)
demanding this, the particularly trenchant resistance to theory within this
ﬁeld is not reducible to mere outside pressure groups. The point I want
to stress is that there was nothing inevitable about the ﬁeld’s developing
in this way. Indeed, a focused reading of its history opens a window onto
other ways in which it could have developed and may yet still. Indeed, it is
the purpose of this genealogy to highlight just this possibility.
I use the term genealogy rather than history quite deliberately.
What I have written is not history in the traditional sense. Thus, experts
in any of the various subﬁelds that operate under the rubric of Asian area
studies, be they China, Japan, or Indic studies, maywell fail to see their own
subﬁelds’ history fully and clearly explored in these pages. That is because
the tale I wish to tell is not merely an amalgam of all of the constitutive
parts of Asian area studies. In other words, the order of appearance of
events, or the relative weight or standing of concerns within any of these
subﬁelds, is not merely a version of the area studies ﬁeld in miniature.
Area studies, quite to the contrary, selectively developed some concerns and
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not others, and the order of appearance of what would become important
may not have been reﬂected equally in all ﬁelds. Thus, in research on
China the philological urge would remain long after it had faded in other
branches of area studies. Similarly, the concerns of colonial governance
would fuel an interest in administration and observation that would be
much less powerful in research on countries thatwere not colonized. Rather
than plot the development of each subdiscipline and explore the way in
which they contributed to the development of the ﬁeld as a whole, I have
focused instead on those practices within philology and Oriental studies
that would either come to direct the discursive ﬁeld or to play a pivotal
role in the formation of the ﬁeld. This essay is, therefore, very much a
“history of the present,” for I am interested in how area studies came to
be formed in such a way that its radical potential was neutralized. It is
my contention that in employing this genealogical method in a scrutiny of
Asian area studies practices and prehistories, the ﬁeld turned its back on
certain possibilities that could have and could yet transform area studies
into a more theoretically informed set of intellectual practices. Like the seas
that constantly lashed the dykes in Hanzhou, the alternative area studies of
which I speak offers the possibility of eroding the shorelines of certainty on
which the practices of homogeneous social science incorporation have been
built.
By broadening out and theorizing its understanding and appre-
ciation of language study, area studies would come to recognize the theo-
retically charged nature of any notion of linguistic and cultural difference.
Through this recognition, a set of practices could be adopted that not only
would help area studies overcome its empiricism, but would also expose
the “epistemic violence” of social scientiﬁc model building that currently
attempts to colonize area studies. A careful examination of the prehistory
of area studies not only helps explain why a type of ideologically invested,
logocentric, but theoretically informed, translational practice gave way to
a descriptive “applied” one, it also helps situate a recuperative move from
within the trope of language study itself. After all, the study of language
lies behind many of today’s most “dissonant” scholarly practices.
From Lacanian psychoanalysis to the structural anthropology of
Claude Lévi-Strauss, language formed the basis on which a set of new
grammars of understanding came into being. Barthesian semiotic studies
also drew on linguistic notions of the signiﬁcation process to formulate
a social semiotics that would reveal a “latent” (connotative) meaning be-
hind the explicit (denotative) one.10 Like area studies, these three discrete
507
Dutton . Lead Us Not into Translation
grammars of understanding owe their very existence to philology, but what
they would take from this now defunct ﬁeld was a set of practices very
different from those adopted by area studies. And while none of these is
without its own problems, they at least share the common virtue of appreci-
ating that “language has not only a grammatical logic but also an historical
memory” (Mignolo and Schiwy 2001), and this forces them to explore a
world that goes beyond the “manifest” descriptive and empiricist forms
that dominate area studies knowledges. They hint at the possibilities avail-
able for an alternative “way of doing” language study that is theoretically
nuanced, culturally embedded, and speaks directly to the language core of
the area study knowledge form.
Despite an abiding logocentrism, philology also (and from its very
earliest moments) employed a set of buried semiotic practices, which en-
abled language and knowledge to be tied together in a quest for the truth
of the cosmos. They would also infect the early days of Oriental studies
and lead the young Victor Hugo to proclaim that “in the century of Louis
XIV one was a Hellenist: today one is an Orientalist” (quoted in Schwab
1986, 15). This enchantment with difference underpinned the privileged
status Oriental studies once occupied within the Western academy and, in
a radically different and far less theological way, has reappeared to inform
postcolonial discourse as a parallel and possibly rival humanities discourse
to area studies social scientism.
To validate the myriad of contentious claims made in these open-
ing remarks requires a detailed examination of philology and a recognition
of that ﬁeld as the precursor to Oriental and Asian studies. Such recogni-
tion not only highlights the translational nature of Asian area studies but
also helps locate the suggestion that more recent theoretical reﬂections on
translational practices speak directly to issues that should be central con-
siderations within Asian studies. In short, this close examination of the
prehistory of Asian area studies raises the specter and possibility of other
ways of “doingAsia.” To begin to develop this, however, requires a detailed
mapping of how the ﬁeld has become a domain of applied translation, and
to tell this tale requires starting, as all good stories do, at the beginning. In
this particular case, that beginning is Genesis.
Lead Us Not into Translation
In the ﬁrst book of the Bible, we are told how Noah’s three sons, Shem,
Ham, and Japhet, settled on the plains of Shinar and attempted to build
a tower to touch the gates of heaven. We are also told of God’s response.
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Where once there was one language and one people, God’s wrath led to
their being scattered and their tongues confounded. Where once “word”
and “thing” were one and humankind basked in the wisdom and unity of
the “name giver” Adam (who, despite the Fall, was still the most knowl-
edgeable sage the world had known), after Babel, what John Locke later
described as “the trick of words” prevailed.11 Undeterred by God’s wrath,
later Christian philologists would try to build a new tower and recover this
“primitive” transparent language, but they would avoid heresy by building
on scripture.
Read literally, the Bible offered a road to redemption and a clue
to the recovery of the original transparent language, itself a path back to
the wholeness of humankind. Whether one started from the book of the
original scribe, Enoch, or from Babel, a reading practice developed that
Jacques Derrida (1974, 75) would later describe as the theological prejudice
and Hans Aarsleff would call Adamicism, a notion, Aarsleff stressed, that
went well beyond the question of “resemblance,” for it was too infected by
the religious to be reduced to this one notion.12 The point to note is that,
by the sixteenth century, “in becoming Bible-conscious, Europe became
Babel-conscious” (Bodmer 1944, 444).
The literal reading of the Bible fueled a scholarly quest for origin
that informed the endeavors of archaeologists, philologists, linguists, and
theologians alike. It led to studies of arcane language forms that centered on
the language of the Bible. If truth were to be found in the revealed nature
of Scripture, then the language of Scripture must be the earliest.13 Hence,
under the inﬂuence of theChurch, scholars of theRenaissance period sought
to recover the original primitive language, as early philologists called it,
for this language would unlock the oneness of humankind. This early
comparative language study involved the comparison of biblical “words,”
especially verbs or nouns (words of action and naming words) as “signs”
that could lead to the (re)discovery of the original primitive language. At
the center of this teleologically conceived quest was a belief that inscribed
in origin was immanent future. Variants on this theme would eventually
lead away from the Semitic languages to those that displayed an arcane and
distinctive form. Chinese, because of its pictographic characters and ancient
lineage, proved to be of particular interest.
In this regard, the work of the Jesuit Athanasius Kircher was
both idiosyncratic and exemplary. Like many before him, Kircher ascribed
central importance to overcoming the “word-thing split,” and this, in turn,
led him to value highly the pictographic, nonphonetic language forms. He
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saw a link between Chinese characters and Egyptian hieroglyphics and
argued that this pointed to a genealogy of the greatest import (Mungello
1985, 134–64). Kircher was not alone in his high valuation of Chinese. John
Webb (1669), the ﬁrst to write in English of the importance of Chinese
script, was also the ﬁrst to posit the idea of Chinese as the “mother tongue”
of God. While Origen believed the non-Semitic world had been left to
God’s angels, Webb suggested they had simply avoided the great ﬂood and,
therefore, the wrath of God.14
Webb’s argument highlighted a minor trend in late-seventeenth-
century scholarship known as the Noachidian theory of descent. In essence,
Noachidian theory put forth the idea that Noah’s three sons, Shem, Ham,
and Japheth, had gone forth and spread God’s Law throughout the world,
including Asia. According to Leibniz, the prominent German astronomer
Johannes Kepler drew on this idea to suggest that the origins of Chinese
civilization bore a “remarkable similarity to the Noachide theory” (Mun-
gello 1985, 35). This theory was, however, greatly challenged because of
the reduced role it attributed to the Jews as the chosen people. Clearly, if
China was to be so highly valued, the role of the Jews would, by necessity,
diminish. That was, of course, until the discoveries at Kaifang.
“OnMay 16, 1707,”MauriceOlender (1992, 21) tells us, “Le Journal
des Scavans announced to its readers ‘a very important discovery’ made in
K’ai-feng [Kaifang] in the province of Hunan, China.” The Jews of China
hadbeendiscovered and their lineage led back to a timebeforeChrist. From
these ancient peoples, it was hoped, an authentic, uncorrupted version of
the Bible would be found and Providential truth would be restored. The
long simmering controversy over the 1546 decision of the Council of Trent
to recognize the Vulgate as the sole authentic biblical text would ﬁnally be
challenged by this news from the East.
Alas, such hopes would not be realized. By 1723, textual research
revealed that the Kaifang version of the Bible was virtually identical to the
Amsterdamone (Olender 1992, 22).Nevertheless, this failed to diminish the
belief held by some that within the ancient, sacred, and mysterious scripts
of the East an answer to the Western “self ” could be found that would
prove revelatory. As God was slowly replaced by Mammon, this search for
an original language thatwas itself a search for originwas joined by a newer
set of inﬂuences emanating from mathematics. The slow emergence of the
experimental sciences led to speculation about a new kind of language key
that would be based onmechanical andmathematical principles (Mungello
1985, 39).
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In crucial respects, this new tendency was itself religiously based
insofar as it relied on a methodology employed in the religious exegetical
tradition, which searched not for an original language but for “a univer-
sal matrix for all languages” (Eco 1995, 49). That is to say, it sought the
universal formula beneath the surface of language. The mystical cabal-
istic techniques of textual decoding offered an example of this religious
practice, and they would later play a key role in informing the calculus-
based language-generating schemas ofRaymondLull andNicholas ofCusa
(ibid., 60, 69). While such techniques began as a mechanism for the reve-
lation of hidden religious truths and, in Lull’s case, offered the possibility
of conversion to the universal Truth of Christ, they also led, in part, away
from the unity of the Church: like other tendencies abroad at this time,
they raised the possibility of challenges to the canonical status of Church
readings based on Latin translations.
The principle challenge to Latin, however, came not from lan-
guage research but from Protestantism, which refused to accept the truth
of the canonical Latin translations offered by the Catholic Church. Latin’s
inability to offer an incontestable textual certainty would lead to its decline.
Hence, what was once the universal language of “the known world,” held
together by sacred commitments was, by the sixteenth century, a language
in rapid decline (Anderson 1983, 24–25). Increasingly, universality would
come not from a shared language of communication but in the form of
shared formulas. By 1662, even the Royal Society had abandoned Latin
and, within thirty years, the French society did the same. The universal
language that had tied Christendom together on the basis of a shared set
of linguistic expressions of that religious commitment was no more. In its
place there emerged a new linguistic nationalism, on the one hand, and a
growing scientiﬁc language of universalism, on the other.
Perversely, this decline in Latin led to increased scholarly concern
about language, which translated in some quarters into further research on
language keys. Through the development of such “keys,” it was hoped that
any linguistic meaning from whatever language group could be immedi-
ately translated, thereby obviating the need for a single universal language
(Anderson 1983, 194). In this respect, the decline of Latin and the rise in
interest in language signaled the shift from an old, religiously based form
of universality to a new, more abstract one that was being imagined and
written in the language of science or pseudoscience. A desire for a new
language or a new understanding of language based on logarithmic and
algebraic principles was emerging (Bodmer 1944, 443–44). From Francis
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Bacon to Robert Boyle, this desire found expression in the various schemes
to promote a new, “rational” language; one that would mimic the symbol-
ism of science itself. A new way of seeing was therefore slowly emerging
out of old exegetical methods.
This shift from the exegetical to the “scientiﬁc” signaled, accord-
ing toMichel deCerteau, amovement from symbol—where hidden textual
meanings were interpreted by authorized commentary—to the “cipher”—
where analytical techniques offered a “totalizing taxonomy” and “universal
instruments” to ensure “comprehensiveness.” The “cipher,” as de Certeau
(1988, 74) notes, was a model that could only come into effect through
a homology between erudition and mathematics. Yet while symbol and
cipher appear to speak to different worlds, they were not entirely opposi-
tional: both grew from the same desire for God’s truth and for linguistic
“transparency.” Science, therefore, could work in the interests of the one
true religion. Unity could once again be restored, but this time it would
be proven through the universal truths of science. Indeed, as Renan notes,
philology would create the “irrefutable scientiﬁc basis for Christianity” and
establish a “ﬁrm and objective link” between Christian truth and scientiﬁc
truth (quoted in Olender 1992, 77).
Once again, the nonphonetic basis of Chinese proved wondrously
portentous. Jesuit linguistic discoveries in China seemed to work in sym-
pathy with scientiﬁc innovations in the West to awaken interest in the
character-based script of Chinese. At the very time symbolic algebra was
forging a new universal community of understandings among scientists,
built on shared knowledge of symbols and calculi rather than shared lin-
guistic knowledge, China’s character-based language was found to offer
an example of these same principles at work within language itself. The
religious privilege became a scientiﬁc one, as Chinese appeared to be an
identikit of what Bacon would call “Real Characters.” Chinese, however,
was not the only non-Western language to be privileged, nor the only one
to undergo a partial revolution in the way that privilege was ascribed.
If the search for the Primitive Language venerated antiquity, then
the discovery in 1785 of the ancient Indic script of Sanskrit, which was far
older than any Semitic language, would, as Schwab notes, put the ﬁnal nail
in the cofﬁn of a world considered to be only biblical. He argues that this
(re)discovery not only upset existent philological theory but, given the early
language scholars’ insistence on the unity of language andhumanity, opened
the whole of scholarship to its impact. The problem with this argument is
that by the time of Sanskrit’s (re)discovery, the old philological argument
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was amere shadow of its former self. Even within the religious community
the idea of a primitive language had, by this stage, given way to a belief
in linguistic diversity before Babel and to the radical idea that linguistic
confusion was natural (Eco 1995, 86). Moreover, the view of script itself
as sacred had long since been eroded, as interest in primitive languages
developed into the studies of mother tongues (85).
Nevertheless, even in accepting these important caveats, one
should not dismiss Schwab’s thesis in toto, for, as evenUmberto Eco admits,
these theological arguments faded rather than vanished.15 Moreover, even
in faded forms, these old theological arguments unconsciously reinforced
the prestige of this ancient language that was now being openly privi-
leged on a very different basis. “All the human sciences,” writes Olender
(1992, 7), “from history to mythology, and soon to include ‘racial science,’
were affected by the discovery of a tongue that was known not only as
Indo-European but also Aryan.” Sanskrit would seal the fate of those old
biblically based attempts to forge a close alliance between philology and
theology, for the idea of the Semitic languages as origin was no more. At
the same time, however, it opened up new intellectual vistas. In this new
world of scholarship, the privilege of Sanskrit would derive less from its
senescence than from its relationships with European languages. A sub-
stantial part of its newly privileged status came from the central place it
occupied in Franz Bopp’s new ﬁeld of comparative philology. The impor-
tance of Sanskrit to Bopp and other comparative philologists largely rested
on the ﬁndings of Sir William Jones (as articulated in his 1786 presidential
discourse to the Asiatic Society). He was the ﬁrst to make the now famous
correlation between the internal structure of Sanskrit and European lan-
guage forms (de Saussure 1959, 2). According to Jones, Sanskrit was very
close to European languages for it “bears a stronger afﬁnity, both in the
roots of verbs and in the forms of grammar, than could possibly have been
produced by accident” (quoted in Pedersen 1931, 18).
Whether one followed Friedrich von Schlegel, who argued that
Latin, Greek, and the Germanic and Persian languages were all derived
from this “mother language,” or Bopp, who suggested that Sanskrit was
merely the “elder sister,” is of little consequence, for the question of the root
language had lost its importance (Foucault 1970, 292). What mattered was
Bopp’s insistence that Sanskrit exceeded both Greek and Latin in structure
and clarity. Hence, he argued that it was of the utmost signiﬁcance (Müller
1861, 21–22). Sanskrit seemed to possess a dual privilege. It retained its
status as a romantic language par excellence, for it opened the Western
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world to a knowledge of the sacred texts of the East; yet at the same time
it played a privileged role in the new “scientiﬁc” discourse of comparative
grammar. In relation to this, Schlegel’s work was critical, and two aspects
of his scholarship in particular would come to revolutionize philology and
its ways of carrying out research. Indeed, it was on the basis of these two
innovations that philology would come to represent itself as the science of
language.
First, according to Max Müller, it was Schlegal who came forth
with the propositions necessary to undermine the belief in hierarchical
classes of languages predicated on age. In place of this, Schlegel suggested
smaller language families that were aligned less by ancestry than by shared
grammatical structures. Schlegel, in examining the languages of the world,
concluded by linking the signiﬁcant European and classical languages to-
gether and then back to Sanskrit. Thus, while the terms “Indo-German”
or “Indo-European” language group were not his inventions, they were
nonetheless an outcome of his work.16
Second, Schlegel developed the method of “comparative gram-
mar,” which provided the theoretical basis for a detailed construction of
language families and groups.17 Comparative grammar offered, for the
ﬁrst time, a systematic means by which to trace language connections and
privileges on the seemingly more scientiﬁc basis of syntactical structures.
Schlegel’s comparative grammar displaced the previous emphasis on the
word. No longer would one inquire into the essential architecture of the
word;18 instead one would focus on grammatical totality. The effect of
this was signiﬁcant for it broke the connection between language and hu-
man activity that had sustained the great philological homology between
language and knowledge. With Schlegel’s work, philology moved from
this classical emphasis on reconciliation of the “word-thing split” toward
a more comparative frame where grammar and structure were central to
all inquiries. Philology was no longer anchored to references in the Old
Testament; it was no longer tied to grand homologies. In place of this, one
discovers a more detailed, “rational,” but esoteric and introspective study
of language structures.
In this transformation one can see the beginnings of the “disci-
plines,” yet at the time the importance of this shift was far from clear. The
reasons for this opacity had to do with the dual register by which philology,
like Sanskrit, valorized its privileged status.AsAarsleff (1982, 32) has noted,
comparative philology had all the hallmarks of a new “model science,” but
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it kept these behind a cloak of “spirituality.” Comparative philology main-
tained the high culture claim to be “opening the sacred books of the East”
but nowdid so on the basis of “rational” scientiﬁcmethods that enabled it to
slide easily into a new world of rational disciplinary divisions. This shift to
the more limited disciplinary mode was to have profound effects, not only
in terms of the later discipline of linguistics, but also on the overarching
ﬁeld of Oriental studies.
“Linguistic ﬁnalism” would transform this once theologically in-
spired search for origins into a more limited but “rational” and “scientiﬁc”
search for knowledge. Hence, the legitimacy of philology was no longer
religiously based but dependent on the scientiﬁc claims it could make and
the “form” of rational argumentation it followed. In terms of the latter,
therefore, there were constant attempts by philologists to associate their
discipline’smethodologywith those of the empirical sciences. Schlegel com-
pared comparative philology with Georges Cuvier’s comparative anatomy.
“Comparative grammar,” he wrote, “will give us entirely new information
on the genealogy of languages, in exactly the same way in which compar-
ative anatomy has thrown light upon natural history” (quoted in Pedersen
1931, 19). The methodology for dissecting language, it seems, was the same
as that which ordered and dissected the human body. Methodologically,
the science of the living body and the science of the spoken word were
kindred spirits. For Müller, the science of geology was a more appropriate
analogy,19 for one could compare rock strata in a quarry in the same way
as philologists would compare language grammars. And just as one would
dig in a quarry and ﬁnd ever more ancient layers, so too one could excavate
language and discover its past. Yet this searchwas no longer stoked by those
old religious ﬁres that dreamed of bringing to light the unity of languages
and peoples. By this time, even when philology looked back to ancient
languages, it also looked “inward” to their syntactical structures. The one
compensation in all this for the religiously inspired was that this new pos-
itivistic approach would offer a more scientiﬁc means of translating the
truth of Christ into other languages, making possible more Christian con-
versions. Hence, Müller’s suggestion that the development of comparative
philology was a shift from the metaphor of Babel to that of the Pentecost
was not without a certain materiality!
Where Babel spoke of humanity recovered, the Pentecost spoke
of heathens converted. The metaphor of the Pentecost focused on religious
salvation, and comparative philology nowhad a new technical and scientiﬁc
means to advance this end. Thus, while the proselytizing and evangelical
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aim of the Church was to save souls, it was, of necessity, built on a bedrock
of both colonial conquest and good translational skills. Little wonder that,
for Müller, this shift tied the new light of God into the very heart of this
new science. For him, philology would be the “technical” means by which
the light of Christendomwould shine forth upon the heathen. Moreover, it
would give birth to a new positivistic social research program in which “old
words assumed a new meaning, old problems, a new interest, old sciences
a new purpose” (Müller 1861, 118). Through this new program all peoples
would become susceptible to “the highest mental culture” (ibid.).
It is at this point, and with these words, that a crucial factor in
the development of Oriental studies begins to reveal itself. “Europe and
its other,” that intellectual fulcrum generating Oriental studies, reveals its
Janus face in this Pentecostal claim and, in a very Schmittian way, even in
these early days, shows itself to be political. This desire to convert is the
very point at which “faith ﬁghts errant faith” and this, as Carl Schmitt so
clearly shows, is the most intense of all political moments (Meier 1998, 60).
As a religious quest, “Europe and its other” carries hidden within itself
another potential translation: “friend and enemy.”
It is this important religious element in the development of the
science of comparative philology—a development that would give birth
to both a politics and a ﬁeld that would eventually, and in a secularized
and much more overtly political form, take the name Asian studies—that
one would miss if one were to read the account of the development of
philology rendered by Foucault in The Order of Things. Strangely, for the
author of Power/Knowledge, this element of the story and its implications
are completely absent.
The Absent Orient of Michel Foucault
For Foucault, the key element in the episteme that was marked, in part, by
the emergence of comparative philologywas not the expansion and compar-
ativism of the ﬁeld, and much less its political implications for the colonial
world. What is important for him is the way that the advent of compara-
tive philology announced a particular moment inWestern reason when one
could no longer speak of language being close to knowledge itself. Instead,
as he puts it, a notion of reason came to prevail that would lead language
to “fold in upon itself” and reduce it to a mere object of inquiry.20 Hence-
forth, studies of language would speak only to the internal architecture of
language, and while this was a demotion, this particular demotion had its
“compensations” that would trail across an array of ﬁelds and leave a mark
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on the Western mind. One of these “ﬁelds of compensation” would speak
to the heart and encourage a privileging of the creative language of litera-
ture. Another would speak to the head, leading to the “table-language” of
thosewho dreamed of scientiﬁc transparency. Still anotherwould speak to a
form of reason, the architecture of which was to be found in the syntactical
structure of language itself. In all three cases, Foucault traces the shatter-
ing effect these “remnants” of the once powerful ﬁeld of philology would
have on theWestern notion of reason as they splintered into other domains.
There is, however, one splinter that his otherwise expansive account does
not trace, and that is the emergence of Oriental studies as a discrete ﬁeld.
This, at ﬁrst, may seem like Eurocentricism. After all, The Order of Things
is organized around the appearance of “Man,” and for Foucault, this ap-
pearance led to a dramatic rupture with classical forms of knowledge, of
which the understandings of language were a central part (Rabinow 1989,
8). It was for this reason that language once again acquired an “enigmatic
density” at this time. As we have already seen, such “density” around lan-
guage was nothing new. What was signiﬁcant in this new episteme was
that this “density” emerged not because of the search for a primary word,
but because of the ability of language study itself to create conditions for
an epistemic disruption of that cosmology of the word. Indeed, it enabled
the creation of a series of metalanguages through which the grammar of
Western thought could be questioned. It was the appearance of “otherness”
and “dissonance” that, Foucault argues, would come to orientate the critical
accent of nineteenth-century thought.
From the grammar of words (Nietzsche), to the grammar of eco-
nomic life (Marx), and, ﬁnally, on to the grammar of those “unspoken
phrases” that inhabit our unconscious and speak of our desires and dreams
(Freud), Foucault’s reading highlights the productive “otherness” of these
“disruptive” discourses. Yet the question remains,What of the “disruptive”
otherness of languages and cultures of the non-West? They may lack the
single, famous “proper name” likeMarx,Nietzsche, orFreud throughwhich
to summarize their project but, given their disruptive effect on philology
itself, surely they, too, are worthy of a “proper place” alongside these dis-
ruptive voices of European “otherness”? After all, part of their appeal to
the nineteenth-century romantics was that their material “otherness” to
the culture and logic of Western thought helped deﬁne the very notion
of European selfhood. Given this, the exploration of the human condition
(that is, the emergence of “Man”) must surely relate in some ways to the
emergence of Oriental studies and help account for its once privileged role.
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As I have shown, studies of the Orient and its languages had, in the past
and in part, been sutured into the theologically inspired quest for origin.
And even after this theological quest for origin was no more, one could
still ﬁnd examples of romantic Oriental scholarship proffering the idea of
an exotic yet profound Eastern knowledge that speaks to all of humanity.
Oriental studies could still lay claim to a certain gravitas by keeping alive
some of these pretensions.
Consider, for example, the fact that many of the romantic writings
about the non-West appear, in hindsight, to have been asmuch a description
of certain unconscious preoccupations and repressions about self—prior to
the invention of these terms—as they were an exploration of non-Western
societies. Could one not posit, for example, that much of the romantic
literature discussing the journey of Eastern knowledge was, in part, an
empirical metaphor and elucidation of what would now, in a very different
“language,” be described as the fort-da relation? Could one not also point
to the endless mimetic appropriations of Eastern knowledge as one moves
from JulesMichelet on individual intuition, EdgarQuinet on liberty, Adam
Smith on universal sympathy, and, more explicitly, the Physiocrats on good
government?21 This list of buried signs of signiﬁcance is, in fact, endless,
and if it is, as I have suggested, a key element in the formation of Western
knowledge, then thisOriental splinter of philological discourse should have
been of the utmost importance to Foucault. After all, the signiﬁcance of this
particular splinter seems to suggest that there could be no discussion of the
emergence of “Man” within that domain of knowledge known once as
philology without an understanding of the way philology engaged with a
domain within its “womb” that spoke of cultures of difference.
The great philologist and Oriental scholar Eugène Burnouf offers
an insight into the way this philological prestige and pretense lived on
in Oriental studies in this 1823 description of translating a Sanskrit text:
“It is more than India, gentlemen, it is a page from the origins of the
world, from the primitive history of human species, that we shall attempt
to decipher together” (quoted in Schwab 1986, 24). With such a strong
romantic conﬁrmation of the importance of this Oriental studies project,
albeit one still anchored in origin, the absence of attention to this ﬁeld in
Foucault seems puzzling. Yet, strangely and, almost despite itself, buried
within Burnouf’s own romantic phrasing lies the answer.
Instead of producing a dissonant new discourse, Burnouf’s “deci-
pherment” conﬁrmed the power of an existing one. Themethods of textual
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translation he employed were now utterly dependent on the logic and rea-
soning of another “language game,” namely, science. Here was a “logic”
that, ten years hence and in the completely unrelated ﬁeld of colonial en-
gineering, could reverse Burnouf’s high valuation of the East and go on
to explain why West was best. It was a reversal summed up in the words
of Prosper Enfantin: “Suez is the Centre of our life work. We shall carry
out the act for which the world is waiting to proclaim that we are male!”
(quoted in Abdel-Malek 1969, 189–98; cited in Bernal 1987, 269).
On the face of it, Enfantin’s assertion of Western male sexuality
and Burnouf’s romantic quest for human origin may appear utterly unre-
lated. Yet what they shared was a belief in the language, logic, and power
that came from different employments of the scientiﬁc method. It is this
method that locates themboth, asMüller puts it, within the “highestmental
culture.” Extraction, translation, mobility, and an ability to combine with
and reconﬁgure other elements of an existing set of knowledges formed the
methodological basis for both these disparate discourses. And just as sci-
entiﬁcally based translational practices would render an exact knowledge
of texts “from the origins of the world,” so, too, the language of modern
science, when applied to engineering works, would refashion the ground
beneath our feet. The magnetic pull of science was beginning to draw a
vast array of “disciplines” into its orbit. Some, as Foucault notes, would
develop their own critical accents that would set them apart. Others, how-
ever, such as those that were more immediately and directly useful to the
process of colonization, would be intellectually reduced, becoming mere
foot soldiers of observation. Scientiﬁc method, therefore, not only reshaped
the ground beneath our feet but also the mental landscape we inhabited. It
was at this crucial juncture, a point at which this essay itself returns to its
opening theme of “science in action,” that Oriental studies would both be
born and cursed. In this subtle shift, which actually gave the ﬁeld its name,
Oriental studieswould no longer command an alternative possibility of the-
oretical production but would instead be demoted to the rank of translator
and supplier of observations valuable to the work of other (disciplinary)
projects. Moreover, all this was taking place at around the time translation
studies was reshaping its practices as a result of the magnetic pull of sci-
ence. Indeed, these epistemic changes would pull even Burnouf’s romantic
sentiments into the logic of scientiﬁc reason and, from there, highlight the
one remaining value Oriental studies had, relevance.
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Transforming Translation
In classical times, what was essential in translation was not exactitude but
expropriation to enrich one’s own language. As Saint Jerome put it, “The
translator considers thought content a prisoner which he transplants into
his own languagewith the prerogative of a conqueror” (quoted in Friedrich
1992, 12–13). By the middle of the eighteenth century the revolution taking
place in comparative philology changed this view.22 The “original” text was
no longer a prison but a laboratory and the conqueror increasingly took on
the guise of a scientist of language.While philology had abandoned studies
of the word for ones that focused on the structure of language, translation
studies rediscovered the importance of the word, albeit in a very different
way. With word in hand, it demanded of itself the impossible: a word-
for-word translation, or as near as one could get to that.23 While philology
had abandoned the search for origin, translation, in a very different way,
reinscribed origin in the privilege it accorded to the (original) text (Schulte
and Biguenet 1992, 3). From the ﬁeld of comparative philology, with its
recently acquired concern for the internal grammars and structures of lan-
guage, came a translational practice that similarly concerned itself with
structure and detail. But the devil in this detail was a turning of the tables
on theology’s search for truth and transparency in origin. From this time
on, translation studies looked forward to a time when the promise of a
scientiﬁc knowledge matrix would fulﬁll its dream of transparency. Very
quickly, however, it became apparent that good translation required more
than a word-for-word account. Words required “contextualization,” and it
was Michel Bréal (in his “Les idées latentes” [1897]; cited in Mitchell 1988,
141) who would state this succinctly: “It does not sufﬁce at all, in order to
give an account of a structure of a language, to analyze its grammar and to
trace the words back to their etymological values. One must enter into the
people’s way of thinking and feeling.”
It seems clear from this, asTimothyMitchell intimates, that philol-
ogy, in part at least, authorized not only the search for the nature of the
human spirit but, in the case of knowledges that spoke of material states of
being (such as Oriental studies), for a more modest, localized, and applied
social research agenda. But why, one might begin to wonder, would this
ﬁeld that required entering “into the people’s way of thinking and feel-
ing” approach this as a need for an applied, almost area-studies social
research agenda? This question is particularly apposite when one considers
those other “splinters” of philological thought that were privileged because
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of their radically different and quite revolutionary notions of difference.
These ﬁelds also would need to speak to the question of “the people’s way
of thinking and feeling,” but they would do so not by reference to the sur-
face appearance of things but by focusing instead on the buried processes
of signiﬁcation on which such surfaces were laid. It is at this point that we
need to return to Foucault.
Foucault points out that the new “grammars” ofMarx, Freud, and
Nietzsche would build on the “dissonance” buried withinWestern knowl-
edge of a certain “otherness” of economy, consciousness, and language. If it
was indeed from within philology that such dissonance would grow, then
religious methods cannot be ignored. This is because these “new gram-
mars” would all, in their own unique ways, gain protean strength thanks
to a long held but buried commitment within philology to what we might
now call an early “philosophy of the dissonant sign.” In classical times,
“nouns” and “verbs” would be read beyond their literal meaning as “signs”
through which one could trace the language and wonders of God.24 It was
just this attempt to reach beyond the “manifest” level of surface appearance
and touch an inner symbolic meaning that would reemerge in a secular
form and come to deﬁne these new grammars of dissent.
Freud’s work, for example, would produce a “dissonance” that
spoke directly to “the people’s way of thinking and feeling” by attempting
to unmask the meaning of the “unspoken phrase.” In doing this, he would
come to recognize the value of past symbolic, religious, and “fanciful” inter-
pretations of dreams but would then pivot this question away from “dream
content” operative at a manifest level toward the latent “thought-content”
that lay beneath the surface.25 This approach required the disruption of
the order of appearance of phenomena within the dream, and led to an ap-
preciation of compression, substitution as well as concealment. For Freud,
such unconscious forms would often manifest themselves in the gesture,
the utterance, or the slip of the tongue. They would hint at an unconscious,
repressed thought that could be brought to the surface by his “talking
cure.” Where Freud would look at the internal grammar of the individual
in his employment of otherness, Marx, if Slavoj Žižek is to be believed,
offered an account of the collective unconscious of capitalism.26 He would
do this by pointing to the way that social change was orchestrated within
capitalism under the sign of the “natural laws of production.” Such natural
laws he would reveal as being little more than a form of repression that
would enable exploitation to appear “natural.” But if the “unconscious”
of these “natural laws” could be disinterred, they would be shown to be
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anything but natural (Marx 1976, 899). Even in linguistics, this type of anal-
ysis would eventually arise once the inward move of philology was halted
by a recognition that language itself was a social phenomenon. Language
research would return to social analysis with a recognition that language
was a “social event,” a “two-sided act,” as V. N. Voloshinov (1973, 84, 94)
puts it. Thus, far from being internal to itself, language was only explicable
in terms of “dialogue.”
“Even an infant’s cry,” writes Voloshinov (1973, 87), “is ‘oriented’
towards the mother” and the growing recognition of this led away from
the philological obsession with reviving “cadavers of written languages.”
As these “ancient monuments” of the “ﬁnished monologic utterance” gave
way to a focus on lived verbal utterances (72), a second shift began to
take place. In this post-Saussurian world, emphasis would be redirected to
the multitude of ways in which dialogue would be inﬂected. Stylization,
parody, staz, and dialogue were the devices employed by Mikhail Bakhtin
when he set about to determine many of the verbal “postures,” accents, and
subtexts that could transform a remark into a sign of joyousness, anger,
interrogation, and so on.27 In other words, one begins to recognize that the
“philosophy of language is the philosophy of the sign” (Voloshinov 1973,
3); herein lay the beginnings of Marxist semiotics.
Thus, in altogether different ways (words/signs, conscious/uncon-
scious, economy/political economy), these types of “latent” analyses differed
from “manifest” understandings of how one “must enter into the people’s
way of thinking and feeling.”
To gain such entry, these “dissonant” discourses employed a kind
of internal “otherness” to produce a “distanciation effect” with regard to
prevailing knowledge forms, and it was this that created the “otherness”
of which Foucault speaks. Yet when it came to the very domain where
“otherness” took on a lived material form (Oriental studies), the result
was intellectual impoverishment brought on by an applied research agenda
that operated almost entirely on a “manifest” level, one reinforced by a
view of language itself as only a “tool.” In this domain, “the people’s way
of thinking and feeling” was only registered by surface description and
only uncovered at the level of applied, descriptive research using the skills
acquired in applied language study.
It was this shift of focus away from questions about ontological
and theological matters to ones concerned with surface description that
led to the “demotion” of Oriental studies from its once privileged place
within philology. Moreover, and it was this trajectory that would then
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form the contours along which area studies’ “way of knowing” would
eventually travel. The applied, descriptive quality of Asian area studies
was, therefore, not simply an effect of Cold War functionalism or a shift
from the humanities to the social sciences, although, to be fair, these things
would highlight and lay bare the politics behind the sign, “Europe and
its other,” under which Asian area studies labored. In effect, however, the
ﬁeld had already been theoretically laid out long before it was “named.”
As Oriental studies was demoted, the ﬁeld opened itself to an area-studies
way of knowing. At the time it looked like anything but a demotion.
One ﬁnds that by the late nineteenth century the expansion and
formalization of colonial governance had put Oriental studies knowledge
in great demand. And while this would lead romantics like Schlegel to
remark sarcastically that India, with the help of Oriental scholars, had
become little more than “England’s milch cow” (quoted in Schwab 1986,
88), such critiques were themselves, by this stage, little short of laughable.
They mattered little in the face of a ﬁeld that was both an urgent political
necessity and could claim to employ the “scientiﬁc method” of the “highest
mental culture.” Besides, there was also the other undeniable fact that this
utilitarian attitude produced the milk of colonial knowledge on which
Oriental studies would feed and grow.28
While one cannot deny that speciﬁc knowledge would be gained
through such involvement with government, one should not forget that the
most valued form this knowledge would take was always one that could
be interpolated into the machinery of colonial government. Here was a
display of power/knowledge that, more than anything, demonstrated the
“tamed” nature of what could, in theory at least, have been a disruptive
domain of knowledge. Intoxicated by its proximity to colonial power and
legitimized by its functional use-value,Oriental studies, far fromdisturbing
the grammar of colonial thinking, became utterly complicit with it. Far
from “disturbing the words we speak” (Foucault 1970, 298), it “translated”
those disturbances intowords that revealed the “truth” not only of India but,
more important, ofWestern “homogeneous,” “scientiﬁc” reasoning. Yet the
more it reiﬁedWestern reason as the organizing trope of its understanding
of the non-Western world, the more it was forced to accept and employ the
“objective” and “rigorous” language of scientiﬁc understanding that killed
off the possibilities of expressing, evenpartly, the order of other cosmologies.
The more such an understanding offered to governments and missionaries
in terms of the functional knowledge value, the more the ﬁeld split into
“functional” subﬁelds that spoke of speciﬁc country-based knowledges. As
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it did this, it further eroded its own status as an independent domain of
knowledge that could speak to the essence of things. In heading down this
path, Oriental studies not only squandered its potential to speak in its own
tongue and produce dissonancewithinWestern reason, but, in exchange for
what intellectually, at least, were the meager privileges that would accrue
from its status as colonial translator, it opened the door to its own demise
at the hands of social sciences, for they would prove to be far more adept
at speaking the “objective” language of science. At the time, however, this
intellectual demise of Oriental studies appeared to contradict “the facts.”
Oriental studies emerged as a discrete domain at the very moment
when the sciences themselves had begun to value the methodology of “sys-
tematic observation” and the so-called empirical style. By the nineteenth
century, this methodology was increasingly ﬁnding a privileged reception
within social inquiry, and the fact that Oriental studies dealt with “real
places” and “real things” by employing applied techniques and translations
made its empirical observations a model form of applied knowledge. Yet in
this claim to its own scientiﬁcity Oriental studies would once again begin
to falter.
By the turn of the nineteenth century, the way descriptive knowl-
edge was viewed had changed dramatically. Earlier statistical analysis had
been treated with immense skepticism within the nascent social sciences
because of the problem of “like species,”29 but by the beginning of the
twentieth century, this was no longer the case. Francis Galton’s work in an-
thropology, Francis Ysidro Edgeworth’s in economics and Karl Pearson’s
in the philosophy of science had begun to produce the type of statistical
methodologies that were about to claim their own privileged status as the
most “objective” approaches to questions of the social sciences. In effect,
this quantitative methodology had already started to erode the more cul-
turally based descriptive approaches at the heart of Oriental studies.30 As
these ideas spread into the social sciences, observational knowledge would
no longer be the basis on which a model discipline would be built. Instead,
such knowledge would be treated as little more than the raw data awaiting
scientiﬁc systematization and quantiﬁcation.
Wedded as it was to observational methods, Oriental studies was
quickly becoming little more than a “content provider” for social scientiﬁc
studies of other cultures. Long gone were the days when Oriental studies
was an exalted domain from which one spoke to the essence of things;
and squandered were the chances it had of achieving its potential as a site
of disruption. Instead, the applied research programs of Oriental studies
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were increasingly dependent on the theories and scientiﬁc practices of other
domains of Western knowledge. It was this trajectory that would simulta-
neously damn this domain intellectually and empower it politically. Thus,
while Oriental studies was evacuated of any pretensions to theoretical cri-
tique, the one remaining “compensation” offered to this ﬁeld lay in the
claims it could now make to know “native” peoples and languages. Its one
distinctive claim thus rested on its applied language training.
Curiously, then, this ﬁeld that would speak directly to questions of
material otherness and difference was never to be theoretically charged or
privileged but was instead transformed into a mere domain of application
and observation. Thus, while other protégés of philology would achieve ex-
alted status and come to disturb the words we speak and the grammatical
habits through which we think (Foucault), the applied nature of Oriental
studies found itself increasingly reliant on the language and grammar of
science to provide it with a translational key. Lashed ﬁrmly to this pole of
Western scientiﬁc reason, the potentially radical, disruptive, and “hetero-
geneous” possibilities this ﬁeld had to offer, if differently conceived, were
brought meekly to heel as it became one more brick in the wall around
the “homogeneous” world of reason. It was this “style of thought” that
would offer Oriental studies its one remaining signiﬁcant compensation:
relevance. And this would go on to deﬁne Asian area studies.
Toward an Alternative Conclusion to Asian Studies
The renunciation by Oriental studies to grand universalizing claims and
the birth of a new form of geographically speciﬁc knowledge about texts
and society—which was later to take the name Asian studies—was brought
on by neither a great revolutionary discovery nor a grand methodologi-
cal shift within the ﬁeld itself. Instead, the ﬁeld was slowly transformed
as it drew on the social sciences and began to produce work of deﬁnite
utilitarian value to missionaries and colonial administrators. The increased
productivity of translational practices, brought on through the use of new
scientiﬁc techniques, also furthered this process and reinforced the awewith
which scientiﬁcmethodwas viewed. In the past, scarce textual evidence had
been “supplemented” by individual imagination and creative fancy. With
increased translation skills more material was rendered into Western lan-
guages and this, alongwith the high value nowplaced on observation,made
imaginative leaps simply unimaginable. Instead of textual scarcity there
was now abundance, and this, in turn, increased the tendency to specialize.
Where once “the Orient” could be treated as a single object of scholarly
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inquiry, it was now far too big and complex for such simplicities. As I have
already noted, specialized subdisciplines would emerge, and these would
cluster around the languages studied. The resulting subﬁelds—sinology,
Egyptology, Indic studies, and so forth—reinforced an already existing
trend to organize knowledge around country as well as “culture,” and this,
in turn, furthered the functionality of these ﬁelds. Even within these sub-
ﬁelds, the sheer density of knowledge that was emerging, coupled with the
demand by government, business, and a range of other lobbies for this ﬁeld
to produce functional knowledge, meant that they were constantly being
pulled into the orbit of various disciplines. These factors in turn reinforced
the split between “real” as “place” of description covered by an area study
and “thought” as scientiﬁc knowledge based in or on a discipline.
Somewhat later, and in the United States, these trends would ﬁ-
nally “express” what had long been imminent. By forcing a move away
from the humanities and highlighting utilitarian value above all else, what
ended up being producedwaswhat one scholar has termed a “NorthAmer-
ican way of knowing” (Rafael 1994, 91; see also Chakrabarty 1998). This
would clear the ﬁeld of its remaining romanticism and lead to a combina-
tion of language training and training in social science disciplinary skills.
By the late twenties the Library of Congress had begun to reorganize its
collection into geographically speciﬁc domains,31 and private organizations,
such as the Carnegie Institute, were beginning to fund scholarly ﬁeldwork
that employed the new “interdisciplinary” social science methodologies in
the study of speciﬁc non-Western societies. While the projects they funded
and endorsed were still based on an examination of past great civilizations,
and therefore bore the hallmarks of Oriental studies, the methods being
deployed betrayed the now almost complete dominance of the social sci-
ences and offered “telltale signs” of things to come.32 The arrival of “area
studies” would not take long.
These trends would reach their apogee in the changed geopolitical
climate that followed the SecondWorldWar, but they were already clearly
imminent within Oriental studies. Thus, while Ruth Benedict’s anthropo-
logical study of interned Japanese Americans, commissioned as part of the
war effort against Japan, marked one of the ﬁrst moments of this new ﬁeld
of “applied area studies,” it was in fact not a break but the culmination
of a long trend. Yet it was also a template of things that followed. Here
was a type of scholarship that was contemporary and country based and,
most important of all, had immediate policy dividends. Here was a type
of scholarship that would inspire an entire generation of utilitarian Cold
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War area studies scholars. By the late 1940s the applied models of the social
sciences had begun to cast a shadow over the entire intellectual horizon.
Increasingly, and much more explicitly than in the past, the new ﬁeld of
area studies would turn to the social sciences for explanations of global
developments, for in these, it was hoped, a way would be found to counter
the universalizing Marxist revolutionary accounts of development.33 The
politics of the ﬁeld was now overt, and “friend and enemy” was more than
a trope, it policed boundaries of scholarly acceptability. This part of the
story of Asian area studies—when area studies becomes an overt weapon
of the ColdWar—is well-known, as is the later “insurgency” (Barlow 1993)
of left scholars attached to or associated with the Committee of Concerned
Asian Scholars.34 The overt politicization of this ﬁeld is not what concerns
me here. What does is the limited and limiting notion of what area studies
can do intellectually. And that, I have argued, was a battle that was lost
even before the invention of area studies knowledges.
With language as its only deﬁnable core—and, even here, the
employment of language only as a domain to train in “application”—it
is little wonder that the ﬁeld now lacks any sense of its own intellectual
identity. Yet, as is clear from other domains, language offers a range of other
more intellectually exciting possibilities. To break the atheoretical cycle of
area studies, yet recognize its core, therefore requires circling back to that
moment of language “dissonance” that Foucault identiﬁed. It necessitates
turning away from the temptation to regard itself only as a content provider
for the disciplines and to take more seriously and develop theoretically the
study of its core, language.This time, however, language studywouldnot be
undertaken purely in order to improve “ﬂuency” or simply for “application”
but in order to create a means of producing intellectual “dissonance.” It
would become a means by which we could start to take cultural difference
and the signs of such difference seriously. To do this, we need to return to
those moments when philology gave birth to the language of dissent and
realize that the moves that enabled Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche to speak
in dissonance are historically and intellectually also a possibility for area
studies.
To arrive back at that moment, to treat it not historically as the
moment when Oriental studies began its slippage into area studies, but
theoretically, as a moment of decision about which knowledge form this
nascent domain should take, brings us back to the question of language the-
oretically. Here, the trajectory for the study of language is quite different
from the training role it is currently ascribed. Here, it departs from these
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strictures to suggest a social semiotics that would begin to highlight the
connotative possibilities inherent in language itself. Here is one way to un-
earth latent meaning and heterogeneous forms. It is a means of translating
that can give voice to the murmurs of other cosmologies. Perhaps this way
the Chinese dyke builders will have their day, not as part of the scientiﬁc
world of incorporation but as a tale of otherness, difference, and dissent that
lets us call into question the epistemic violence of scientiﬁc incorporation.
Notes
I would like to thank the Australian Research Council for funding this research and
theMax Planck Institute for History in Göttingen, Germany, where I revised
this piece during a month-long sabbatical.
1. I ﬁrst took notice of this story when I heard it as an aside in a talk by a prominent
historian ofChinese science,whowas explaining the sophistication ofChinese
dyke-making techniques. The story of ceremony was very much given as
light relief, and when the account of the dykes was published, the story of the
archers was omitted. It is still, however, verymuch in the consciousness of the
people of Zhejiang. In a recent commentary on the topic, Ye Bingnan retells
the story of King Qian and the shooting of arrows. King Qian was head of a
small state in the ﬁve dynasties period, which lasted from 825 to 932 a.d. Ye’s
(1993, 23) commentary is as follows:
Concerning Qian’s repairs of the seawalls to prevent
calamities during the Yangtze River tide, there is
a folk tale about “King Qian shooting the waves”
[±‹n]. The story of Qian comes to us from
a portrayal in the “Record of the Shooting of the
Tides” [n°], written by Qian’s third generation
offspring, Sun Qian Weiyan. It is said of the early
days of establishing the dyke that it took place in the
eighth month, at a time of high tides and seasonal
ﬂooding. The raging tide and pounding swirl made
it impossible to carry out construction work. Qian
therefore ordered and led the deployment of soldiers
to the site. From the hillsides down to the southern
side of the mountain sturdy bamboo trees were
made into three thousand arrows by woodworkers.
These arrows were then adorned with the feathers of
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various birds, and painted with a ﬁery red coloration,
and newly ﬁredmetalwas used tomake the arrow tips.
Five hundred soldiers who had the skill and strength
to ﬁre the crossbow were assembled at the banks of
the Yangtze River and each archer was given six ar-
rows. Each time there was a tidal rush, they would ﬁre
one arrow into the raging torrent. It was in this way
that, after they had ﬁred ﬁve times, they unexpectedly
forced the tide to turn away from Hangzhou Bay and
they made these eastern tides turn toward the west-
ern hills. It is said of these ﬁve hundred archers that
they are all buried together at Pubing [fu], an area
betweenHouchaomen andTongjiangmen. Above the
ground in which they lay, a memorial was erected to
them in a place called Tiezhuangpu. In Hangzhou’s
Jianggan district; even to this day, there are still two
lane-ways bearing the names “the horizontal arrow
lane-way” [kS÷] and the “vertical arrow lane-
way” [ôS÷]. It is said that these names are re-
lated to the story of King Qian and the shooting of the
tide.
2. For a very different “take” on a similar event, see Michel de Certeau’s opening lines
in The Writing of History. De Certeau begins this work by examining the
etching by Jan van der Straet of Amerigo Vespucci’s “discovery” of native
Americans (they were not known before?) in the NewWorld. It is with this
encounter with the other that de Certeau begins his examination of Western
writing as historical practice. See de Certeau 1988, xxv–xxvii.
3. T-O maps were popular in Christendom from about the seventh to ninth centuries
until the mid-1300s. They were highly symbolic, being circular in shape and
dividing the world into three parts to form a T, at whose center was the holy
city of Jerusalem.
4. After its erection the artists objected: “We come, writers, painters, sculpters, archi-
tects . . . in the name of French art and history that are both threatened, to
protest against the erection in the very heart of our capital of the needless
and monstrous Eiffel Tower” (Louis Chéronnet, cited in Buck-Morss 1991,
131). Guy de Maupassant, claims Roland Barthes (1982, 236), “often lunched
at the restaurant in the tower, though he didn’t much care for the food:
‘It’s the only place in Paris,’ he used to say, ‘where I don’t have to see it.’”
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Despite these early artistic objections to the structural aesthetics of the tower,
it was later hailed because it offered “the fundamental aesthetic experience
of today’s buildings” (Giedion 1926, 7; quoted in Benjamin 1983–84, 3). As
Walter Benjamin elsewhere said, it was an “incomparable” monument to the
“heroic age of technology” (quoted in Buck-Morss 1991, 130). Susan Buck-
Morss notes that Benjamin believed that the artists, in attempting to defend
themselves against the perceived threat of this new technology, missed the
real danger, namely, the shopwindow where the display of art was “in the
service of the salesman” (134).
5. Indeed, according to Umberto Eco (1995, 209), one motive for the English search for
a universal language key was that it would facilitate trade.
6. Littlewonder that twoof themost famous critics of rational choice theory fromwithin
that logic,DavidGreen and Ian Shapiro, have pointed out that the only reason
such modeling could be regarded as rigorous and universally applicable was
because the models could never actually be falsiﬁed! All rational choice
does, they claim, is reconﬁgure existing empirical knowledge into rational
choice forms. For that reason, they conclude that rational choice theory has
contributed “virtually nothing to the empirical study of politics” (Green and
Shapiro 1994, 195). For an excellent and succinct summary of the debate see
Brogan 1996.
7. Recent German scholarship on China challenges the philological roots of Chinese
studies. Formy argument, however, the veracity of this history is not the issue.
Rather, I am interested in the effects of the belief in this past, irrespective
of whether it is a post factum rationalization or not. For the controversial
argument suggesting that German Chinese studies is not philological, see
Leutner 2001 (thanks to Peter Mereker for guiding me through this).
8. Pierre Ryckmans (Simon Leys) (1984, 20), for example, has argued that “the sinolog-
ical ﬁeld is deﬁned linguistically.” More recently, Vicente L. Rafael (1994, 91)
has deﬁned the whole of area studies as “ensembles of knowledges and prac-
tices grounded on speciﬁc linguistic competencies and formulated within, as
well as across, disciplinary boundaries.”
9. In the case of Chinese studies, at least, this was reinforced by the gaozhen (or K’ao-
cheng) approach to knowledge that emerged in the late Qing dynasty and
stressed “facts” and philology. See Elman 1984.
10. Barthes’s famous example of denotative meaning—“Here’s a black soldier saluting
the French ﬂag”—was deepened with a recognition of its “symbolic” conno-
tative intent, which in this case suggested a mixture of colonialist nationalism
and militarism. For an investigation of this linguistic link see Coward and
Ellis 1977.
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11. Note, for instance, Luther’s remark on Adam: “What an ocean of knowledge and
wisdom there was in this one man!” See Aarsleff 1982, 281.
For Locke, of course, such a “trick” was unavoidable, and my use
of the term here is therefore ironic. Locke saw words as signs of ideas and
language itself as a human invention. Words had no core that tied them back
to objects any more than languages were divinely inspired. The whole idea
of a search for an original universal language was, therefore, for Locke, a
complete misunderstanding of the nature of words and language. For more
details on Locke see ibid., 42–83.
12. While some have regarded Enoch as “the scribe” and therefore become interested in
the language in which he wrote, Augustine believed that Enoch, the seventh
generation from Adam, was simply too ancient to be a reliable witness, and
that his book therefore could not be included in the ecclesiastical canon, for
false things may have been inserted in it. I wish to thank Allen Kerkeslager
(Department of Theology, St. Josephs University, Philadelphia) for his help
in positioning Enoch in this debate.
Aarsleff (1982, 22) offers this comment on Adamicism in relation
to Foucault’s reading in theOrder of Things, which he ﬁnds too simplistic and
secular. Louis Marin (1989, 4) similarly critiques the lack of the religious in
that work.
13. Hebrew was central to this quest, as the early fathers of the Church attest. Saint
Jerome, in one of his epistles to Damascus, wrote that “the whole of antiquity
afﬁrms that Hebrew, in which the Old Testament was written, was the
beginning of human speech” (quoted in Friedrich 1992, 12–13). Origen, in his
eleventh homily on the Book of Numbers, expresses his belief that Hebrew,
originally given by Adam, remained in that part of the world which was the
chosen portion of God, rather than being left, like the rest of the world, to one
of his angels. For further details and claims to this effect seeMüller 1861, 123.
14. Webb’s words were as follows: “Scripture Teacheth, that the whole Earth was of one
Language until the Conspiracy at Babel; History informs us that China was
peopled,whilst theEarthwas so of oneLanguage, and before thatConspiracy.
Scripture teacheth that the Judgment of Confusion of Tongues, fell upon
those only that were at Babel; History informs, that the Chinois being fully
settled before, were not there: And moreover that the same Language and
Characters which long preceding that confusion they used, are in use with
them at this very Day.” Quoted in Kennedy 1965, 104.
15. So diverse was the philological community that even in 1804 the Manchester Philo-
logical Society was able to exclude from its membership anyone who spoke
of Sanskrit or Indo-European languages and doubted the divine revelations.
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Moreover, it was not until 1866 that the Société de Linguistique of Paris
stopped accepting communication on the question of a universal language
(Eco 1995, 114–15).
16. SeeMüller 1861, 162 for the substantive point. It should be noted, however, thatwhile
Müller attributes the terms Indo-German and Indo-European to Schlegel (156–
57), the former term is more readily identiﬁed with J. von Klaproth, while
the latter is attributed to T. Young.
17. While Schlegel’s work inspired the new comparativism, it was Francis Bopp who
published the ﬁrst detailed comparative text in 1816. See Müller 1861, 158.
18. Or, at the very least, when an emphasis on the word did return, as it would in V. N.
Voloshinov’s post-Saussurian “dialogical” approach, it would take Leibniz’s
idea of a “universal grammar” in a very different direction. No longer in-
terested in etymological paths back to God, Voloshinov “demotes” the word
to being merely the “purest,” most universal and “neutral” of “signs” within
any verbal process of communication. With a focus on the signiﬁcation pro-
cesses, rather than on the origin of words, Voloshinov (1973, 14) revalorizes
the word but does so on a new basis: “The entire reality of the word is wholly
absorbed in its function of being a sign,” he stated, thereby offering what
would become the beginnings of a Marxist semiology.
19. Müller (1864, 14) made his view on this point quite clear: “I believe there is no
science from which we, the students of language, may learn more than from
Geology. Now, in Geology, if we have once acquired a general knowledge
of the successive strata that form the crust of the earth and of the faunas
and ﬂoras present or absent in each, nothing is so instructive as the minute
exploration of a quarry close at hand, of a cave or a mine, in order to see
things with our own eyes, to handle them, and to learn how every pebble that
we pick up points a lesson of the widest range. I believe the same is true of
the science of language.”
20. Foucault 1970, 296–97. His reading of the effects of comparative philology is found
in the chapter “Labor, Life, Language,” and it is here that one will ﬁnd the
speciﬁc references to which I refer.
21. For signposts to these appropriations see Schwab 1986; and Maverick 1946.
22. The history of translation is long and complex and varies from one country to
another. Brieﬂy, within English translation studies at least two different po-
sitions prevailed. From the seventeenth century one notes the rise of “trans-
parency” and ﬂuency (or what Lawrence Venuti labels “domestication”) as
considerations in translation. The other approach is much more literal, that
is to say, it retains a certain textual ﬁdelity that produced awkwardness and a
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certain foreignness in the text translated. For more details on this debate see
Venuti 1995.
23. One sees the contemporary effects of this translational method in the defense
mounted by area studies against “alien” Western theory. Note for instance,
the argument proffered by Paul Cohen (1984, 196–97) for a China-centric
approach:
[The] China-centred approach is intended
to delineate an approach to recent Chinese history that
strives to understand what is happening in that history
in terms that are as free as possible of imported criteria
of signiﬁcance. . . .
. . . it will be countered, as long as the prac-
titioners of China-centred historiography are Amer-
icans, no matter how hard we try to get “inside”
Chinese history, we will still end up insinuating into
this history vocabulary and concepts that are Amer-
ican. Outsiders can never really develop an insider
perspective. . . . This is true—up to a point.
24. Even ostensibly secular readings of grammar, such as those offered by the Port-Royal
logicians in the seventeenth century, when more closely scrutinized, turned
out to be thoroughly imbued with Christian metaphoricity. As Marin (1989,
12–14) points out, the eucharistic model reveals “the profound coherence of
the network of examples illustrating the semiotic theory of Port-Royal.”Here
is a theory of speech that “simultaneously” develops “a linguistic theology of
the Eucharist.”
25. While recognizing the limitations of past (largely biblical) interpretations of dreams,
Freud was still quite clear about their value. In examining the dream books
of old he stated that they should not be dismissed in their entirety, for they
offer an example of “one of those not infrequent cases where ancient and
stubbornly retained popular belief seems to have come nearer to the truth of
the matter than the opinion of modern science” (Freud 1966, 191).
26. Žižek (1989, 11) goes so far as to suggest that there is a “fundamental homology
between the interpretative procedure of Marx and Freud—more precisely,
between their analysis of commodity and of dreams.”
27. Skaz is a Russian expression with no English equivalent that is probably best de-
scribed as “narration with marked speech-event features.” See Titunik 1973,
191 n. 19.
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Here, of course, I am merely rehearsing the “dialogistic” thinking
of Mikhail Bakhtin and repeating the point about the “utterance” he makes
most forcefully in Baxtin 1971, 196–98. It should be noted that this point
also plays a key role in that classic Bahktin text on language, enigmatically
authored by either a close follower or by Bakhtin himself under the alter ego
identity of V. N. Voloshinov (1993). See especially part 2, chapters 2 and 3, of
the Voloshinov text.
28. Who could forget, after all, that the ﬁrst Western school for the study of Sanskrit
was opened by the British East India Company in Hailsbury College in 1805,
or thatWarrenHastings’s plan of 1772 for better governance in Bengal ended
up turning on the teaching of Sanskrit as a means to establish a pure “Hindu
law.” For further details on this see Cohn 1985.
29. Note Stephen Stigler’s (1986, 95) words on the problem of like-species within statis-
tical analysis: “Even as late as 1869 it was necessary for the economistWilliam
Stanley Jevons to defend his employment of statistics against the charges that
he was wrong to combine prices of several very different commodities into
one index in a study of variation in the value of gold.”
30. On this importance of science as a “trope” see Latour 1993, 18, 35. On the rather
slow spread of the statistical method to the social sciences see Stigler 1986,
265–66.
31. In 1928 the Chinese-language books in the Library of Congress were the ﬁrst hold-
ings to be gathered together and housed in the newly constituted “Division
of Chinese Literature,” and this would be the model used to reorganize
all other Asian language holdings. The Japanese collection would be rear-
ranged sometime after 1930, and in 1938 the Indian collection would begin
to be housed in a separate section that became, after 1942, the Indic Studies
section of the library’s Asian Division. See Library of Congress 2000, 13, 32,
46. Thanks to Mi Chu of the Library of Congress for pointing out to me this
process of library rearrangement.
32. Dipesh Chakrabarty notes that the ﬁrst such program undertaken under the aus-
pices of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) was a study of Mayan
culture, which brought together archaeologists, ethnologists, historians, ge-
ographers, biologists, nutritionists, medical researchworkers, and other types
of specialists; Chakarabarty 1998; citing Stewart 1950, xi.
33. For examples of this in relation to China see Barlow 1993.
34. So one ﬁnds that in the postwar era in Chinese studies (likemany other non-Western
areas) the struggle was said to have taken place between the modernization
“paradigm” and amore revolutionary outlook. For a critique of what in some
respects foreshadows Cohen’s work arguing for a China-centric approach,
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see Myers andMetzer 1980. For a critique that argues for the need for greater
(not lesser) theoretical rigor, see Johnson 1982; yet even here, while theoretical
rigor is said to be needed to sharpen our focus, what is meant by theory is
little more than stronger reading glasses for the social translator.
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